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RACIAL SEGREGATION IN CALIFORNIA
PRISONS
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 25, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decided Johnson v. Californial-a case that clarified the role
of constitutional rights for prison inmates. The Court held that a
prison reception center housing policy that used race as one factor in
assigning new inmates to a cell for sixty days did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 2 Prison violence
occurs everyday in California prisons and the prison system is at a
loss as to how to control the numerous beatings, stabbings, and
murders. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit allowed the California
Department of Corrections to employ tactics that the court would
likely not allow outside the walls of a prison in an effort to keep the
peace.
3
II. FACTS AND HISTORY OF JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA
A. California Prison Reception Policy
In an attempt to control the frequent violence that occurs within
prisons, the California Department of Corrections (CDC) has
adopted a policy for new inmates who arrive at CDC institutions.
4
The CDC evaluates the inmate's prior criminal history as well as his
incarceration record to determine if the inmate has any enemies
housed in the same facility or any special security needs.5 The
inmates are then assigned to a double cell in the reception area where
they are held for sixty days. 6 Race is a dominant factor when
1. 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 807.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 794.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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determining cell assignment. 7 However, the CDC also considers
other factors such as gender, age, classification score, custody
concerns, safety concerns, enemies incarcerated in the institution,
history, and gang affiliation.
8
Race is a dominant factor because much of the prison violence
has been in reaction to increasing racial tension. Initially, inmates
are classified into four categories: Black, White, Asian and other.
9
In many cases, the CDC finds it necessary to further divide these
classifications into smaller groups. For example, Hispanics from
Northern and Southern California are separated because in the past
the two groups have been in conflict with each other.'
0
With the exception of the reception cells, the rest of the prison is
fully integrated." The CDC justifies this variation in treatment by
arguing that the reception cell is unique in that prisoners are confined
for a large part of the day and the staff has a difficult task controlling
what occurs inside the cell.12 After the sixty day reception period,
the inmate is either transferred to another prison or assigned to a
single cell, double cell, or dormitory. 13 Race is not used as a factor
when determining who will be assigned to a single cell. If assigned
to a double cell, the inmate is encouraged to choose his own cellmate
in order to reduce violence and maintain compatibility.
14
Dormitories house inmates considered nonviolent. 15 Therefore, in
dormitories, inmates of different races are placed together.'
6
However, the CDC does make efforts to racially balance the
dormitories in order to decrease the amount of racial violence typical
in prison.
17
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 794-95.
14. Id. at 795.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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B. Procedural Facts
The plaintiff in this case, Garrison Johnson, was an African-
American prisoner serving a sentence for murder, robbery and
assault with a deadly weapon, and was housed in a California prison
in Lancaster. 18 Since 1987, he had been transferred between multiple
prisons in the CDC including Chino, Folsom, Calipatria and
Lancaster. 19 In 1995, Johnson, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint
alleging the reception area policy violated his constitutional rights.
20
In 1998, the district court dismissed his Third Amended Complaint
without leave and then Johnson appealed.2' In 2000, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case, holding that
Johnson's allegations were "sufficient to state a claim for racial
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 22 In July 2000, Johnson was appointed
counsel and filed his Fourth Amended Complaint seeking monetary
damages from the former CDC directors in their individual
capacities, and injunctive relief against the current CDC director.
23
Both parties then moved for summary judgment. Both motions were
denied.
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Saucier v. Kat
24
prompted the former CDC Directors to move for reconsideration of
the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.25 In
Saucier, the Supreme Court ruled that a court must first decide a case
based on the merits of the alleged constitutional violation before
deciding whether state officials will receive qualified immunity.26
The court must ask whether the facts alleged show the officials'
conduct violated a constitutional right when the facts are taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.27 If the answer
is no, then the case should be dismissed.28 Only when "a violation
18. Id. at 793.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 795.
21. Id.
22. Johnson v. Califomia, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000).
23. Johnson, 321 F.3d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 2003).
24. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
25. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 795.
26. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
27. See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 796 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
28. Id.
Fall 2003]
142 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37:139
could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions"
can a court move to "the next, sequential step [of] ask[ing] whether
the right was clearly established." 9 Following Saucier, the district
court in Johnson granted the motion for reconsideration of denial of
summary judgment and held that the former administrators were
"entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were not clearly
unconstitutional. In this case, Johnson appealed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants to the
Ninth Circuit.
3 1
Iii. SUMMARY OF DECISION
Johnson argued to the Ninth Circuit that the reception policy of
the CDC violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it used race as a factor in determining housing
assignments for the first sixty days of incarceration. 32 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed.33
A. Historical Precedent
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by discussing the precedent
that exists pertaining to racial segregation in prisons.34 Historically,
the courts have enforced the Equal Protection Clause in order "to do
away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race." 35  However, a number of cases deal specifically with the
special circumstances existing in prisons. In Lee v. Washington,
36
the U.S. Supreme Court considered an Alabama statute requiring
segregated cellblocks in prison. 37 It held that the law violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 8 However, the Court recognized in that
case that "prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and
in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in
maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and
29. Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 795-96.
32. Id. at 796.
33. See id. at 807.
34. Id. at 796.
35. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
36. 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
37. See id.
38. See id.
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jails." 39  The court has interpreted Lee as holding that racial
discrimination in the prison context is unconstitutional with the
exception of "'necessities of prison security and discipline."'
' 4
B. Plaintiffs Arguments
Johnson argued that the Supreme Court has never defined
"particularized circumstances" or "necessities of prison security and
discipline," and therefore his case did not fall into either category.4'
Johnson cited cases from other circuits where courts held that an
"unsubstantiated fear of racial violence" does not justify segregation
of inmates into separate cellblocks based on race.42 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished those cases from Johnson, noting that the
former dealt with completely segregated prisons.43 Furthermore,
they involved segregation that was permanent, whereas in Johnson, it
persisted for a maximum of sixty days.44
C. The Turner Test
Declining to use the standard set forth in the cases cited by
Johnson, the Ninth Circuit used the test established in Turner v.
Safley,45 where the Supreme Court examined the constitutional rights
of prisoners.46 Using a relaxed standard to determine constitutional
rights, the Turner court ruled that "[s]ubjecting day-to-day
judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis
would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration," and regulations in the prison context must
only be "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests," to be
constitutional under the Equal Protection clause. 7 Under the Turner
39. Id. at 334 (Black, J., concurring).
40. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (quoting Lee, 390 U.S. at 334).
41. See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 797.
42. Id.; see also McClelland v. Sigler, 456 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1972)
(holding segregation of prison wing unconstitutional).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 797 n.5.
45. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
46. See id.
47. Id. at 89.
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standard, the plaintiff must overcome the presumption "that the
prison official acted within their 'broad discretion."4A
The Turner test has four prongs that must be met when
determining whether the state's actions are reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest: 49 (1) there must be a "valid, rational
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it"; 50 (2) the court must
find "alternative means of exercising the right that remains open to
prison inmates"; 51 (3) the court must assess what "impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards or other inmates"; 52 and (4) the court must determine whether
"ready alternatives" to the policy exist.53
Under the first prong, the court must consider whether the
government's objective is "(1) legitimate, (2) neutral, and (3)
whether the policy is 'rationally related to the objective."' 54 In the
instant case, the prison administrators argued the reception policy
protected the safety of the staff and other inmates. The Ninth Circuit
agreed that this was a legitimate penological interest.5 5 The Johnson
court also found the policy neutral because it did not provide any
advantage or disadvantage to a specific race.
In order to meet the neutral requirement, Johnson argued that
under Lee, the prison must point to a specific instance involving cell
assignments that shows that the policy is necessary. 6 The Ninth
Circuit followed Turner and held the prison need not wait for
violence to occur specifically because of race, but instead can use
race as a factor, if necessary, to avoid potentially dangerous
situations.5 7 The Ninth Circuit, following precedent, held that if a
"common-sense connection [existed] between the governmental
48. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 232 (2001) (citing Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)).
49. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 799.
50. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
51. Id. at 90.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,414 (1989)).
55. See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 799.
56. Id. at 800.
57. Id. at 801.
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objective and the prison regulation," the inmate has the burden of
production.58  Johnson argued he had satisfied this burden of
production, thereby refuting the common-sense connection.59 He
argued the policy had been in place for more than twenty years and
the level of racial violence was still high, thereby showing the policy
did not work.60 He also argued some gangs are not formed along
racial lines so the policy did not address the actual problem of gang
violence.61  The court disagreed, stating that the policy is only
supposed to decrease the amount of prison violence, not eliminate
it.62 The court held that as long as the prison administrators believe
that the policy furthers a legitimate objective, the defendant satisfied
the first prong.
63
The second prong requires the court to determine whether the
plaintiff had alternative means of exercising the right in question.
64
The right in question is whether Johnson can be free from "state-
sponsored racial discrimination." 65 The Ninth Circuit held that this
right must be evaluated on a "macro" level, as it was in Turner.66 In
Turner, the Court decided whether the inmate's freedom of speech
had been violated in its entirety, not if the inmate specifically had a
right to communicate with inmates in other prisons.67 The Turner
court found that the prison policy prohibiting communication with
inmates did not violate the inmate's right to free speech and upheld
the policy. 68 The Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in Johnson.
The court ruled that the correct analysis was "whether the state [had]
provided reasonable alternatives from racial discrimination in
general,' 6 9 not whether "the state [had] provided reasonable
alternatives" during the first sixty days. 70 The court further held that
because the discrimination only lasted for the first sixty days and that
58. Id.
59. Id. at 802.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 803.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
68. Id. at 92.
69. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 804.
70. Id.
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the rest of the prison was fully integrated, the state did provide
reasonable alternatives to exercise his constitutional right.
7'
The third Turner prong requires the court to evaluate what
impact accommodating the prisoner's asserted right will have on
prison personnel, other inmates and prison resources.7 2 Johnson had
to show that eliminating the policy would not impact the inmates and
personnel.73 The court held however that he failed to do so.7 4 The
CDC provided testimony from numerous officials documenting
prison violence based on race and the court found the evidence
persuasive.75 The court thus ruled that the third prong of the Turner
test was satisfied because Johnson did not show that inmates and
personnel would not be impacted if the policy was eliminated.76
The fourth prong of the Turner test requires that the court
determine whether there are reasonable alternatives that would "fully
accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid
",77penological interests .... The Turner court ruled that this was a
"reasonableness" test, not a "'least restrictive alternative"' test and
also that the solution cannot be an exaggerated response.78 Johnson
argued that the prison could screen inmates for gang history or racist
behavior and history of violence.
However, the court did not buy Johnson's argument. According
to the evidence presented by the prison officials, inmates very rarely
disclose their gang affiliation or history of violence to prison
officials. Furthermore, the racial attitudes of inmates on the outside
may change once incarcerated. The court also cited the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause as justification
for the policy. Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are
required to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates. ' 79 In Robinson v. Prunty,8° the Ninth Circuit held that
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 804-05.
76. Id. at 805.
77. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987).
78. Id. at 90.
79. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
80. 249 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001).
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reasonable measures included taking an inmate's race into account
when allowing prisoners on the recreation yards. 8' The Johnson
court also noted that the prison officials could be accused of
"deliberate indifference" if the policy was not enforced and violence
ensued.82 For the above reasons, and because Johnson did not
answer how the CDC would accurately collect such information
about the prisoners' histories, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the policy
was not an exaggerated response but, in fact, was reasonable.
83
In sum, the court concluded that the four prongs of the Turner
test had been met and there was no constitutional violation.
Therefore, it was not necessary to assess the issue of qualified
immunity and the grant of the motion for summary judgment for the
defendants was affirmed.84
IV. ANALYSIS OF DECISION
The decision by the court to allow racial segregation in
California prisons during the sixty day reception period was
reasonable because the segregation policy is necessary to ensure the
safety of prisoners and personnel, and maintain order and control of
the prison population. One could argue that this idea could be
applied in order to racially segregate entire prisons. However, that is
actually a distinguishable situation. The purpose of the segregation
for the first sixty days is to evaluate the new inmates and determine
their level of violence, and, if possible, gather any relevant
information about their past criminal histories and enemies before
assigning them to a permanent cell. Segregating entire prisons is not
used to gather information, but to prevent violence.
The Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's decision to
grant summary judgment was correct. In the initial Saucier decision,
the Ninth Circuit used a different test than it used in Johnson to
decide if a defendant would receive qualified immunity." First, it
looked to see if the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly
established when the incident occurred.86 If the answer was "yes," it
81. Id. at 866.
82. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 807.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (2001).
86. Id.
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moved to a second step: "to determine if a reasonable officer could
have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that [the
plaintiffs] conduct was lawful. ' 7  In Saucier, the Ninth Circuit
court held that because the inquiries of both qualified immunity and
a second claim (a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment) were the
same, qualified immunity was inappropriate. 88  On appeal, the
Supreme Court ruled that there should be no fusion between the issue
of qualified immunity and a separate charge. 89  The qualified
immunity defense should be considered in proper sequence in order
to avoid an unnecessary trial, overruling the Ninth Circuit decision
and creating the test used in Johnson.9° The Ninth Circuit in
Johnson correctly applied the newly formulated Saucier test for
qualified immunity when they considered whether the allegations
showed that the officials' conduct violated a constitutional right, and,
if so, whether the right was clearly established. 9'
The Court also correctly applied the test created in the Supreme
Court's Lee decision. The Supreme Court suggested that when
acting in "good faith and in particularized circumstances," prison
authorities can take racial tensions into consideration for the purpose
of maintaining security and discipline.92 Johnson cited decisions
from other circuits where the courts ruled that an unsubstantiated fear
of violence did not rise to the level required to allow racial
segregation. 93 The Ninth Circuit in Johnson correctly distinguished
those cases from the case at hand, noting that in some of those cases,
the prisons were divided into "white cells" and "black cells" and
evidence existed of disparate treatment, where black prisoners were
not afforded the same privileges as white prisoners.94  These
conditions were not present in the California prisons.
95
87. Id.
88. Id. at 199-200.
89. Id. at 197.
90. See id. at 201.
91. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 796.
92. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
93. See generally Johnson, 321 F.3d at 797 (citing United States v.
Wyandotte County, 480 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding assignment of
inmates by race unconstitutional); McClelland v. Sigler, 456 F.2d 1266 (8th
Cir. 1972) (holding segregation of prison wing unconstitutional)).
94. McClelland, 456 F.2d at 1267.
95. See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 797.
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the Turner standard
to the Johnson case.96 The Ninth Circuit's use of the Turner analysis
was necessary to enforce the notion that life in prison is dangerous
and different than life in the outside world. While the majority of
constitutional rights are maintained while incarcerated, certain rights
must be altered in order to protect prisoners and keep order. The
Turner case took an in-depth look at the activities and needs of
prisoners and staff within the confines of the prison system. Because
racial segregation occurs in many prisons, a test that both aimed at
the goals of safety and discipline, and maintained some constitutional
rights was necessary; the Turner standard met this need. As the
Ninth Circuit in Johnson observed, the Turner standard expanded the
definition of "particularized circumstances" and "necessity of
security and discipline," and it lowered the prison authorities' burden
to justify racial segregation policies.97 The Ninth Circuit applied the
Turner standard in Johnson because it applied to the unique
circumstances that exist in the California prison system.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Prison violence is a real threat in a state like California, where
the penal system is dominated by prison gangs.98  Furthermore,
evidence indicates that most racial violence that occurs in prison is
directly related to gang affiliation.99 For example, in San Quentin, a
maximum security prison, the inmate population is divided among
known black, white, and Hispanic gangs that also operate on the
streets. 100 In California, the major prison gangs include the Aryan
Brotherhood, the Black Guerilla Family, the Mexican Mafia, and
96. Id. at 798.
97. Id. at 798-99.
98. Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War:
American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV.
41, 56 n.69 (1987).
99. See id. at 56-58 (analyzing the problem of institutional management in
prisons and the response by judges, penologists and the prison staff); see also
Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based upon
Alleged Gang Affiliations: A Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a
Proposal for Greater Procedural Requirements, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1137-
38 (1995) (arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires segregation decisions to be based on a violation of prison rules rather
than gang affiliation).
100. Willens, supra note 98, at 55.
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Nuestra Familia.' 0' These gangs are responsible for the steady
increase in violence in California prisons.
10 2
From a young age, many future gang members have little chance
of avoiding the gang life. Juveniles who commit serious or violent
felonies are generally sentenced to the California Youth Authority
(CYA) where approximately 5100 wards are affiliated with gangs.
10 3
Many of the wards in the CYA have criminal associates in the CDC
and these juveniles eventually become members of the Black
Guerilla Family, the Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, or the Aryan
Brotherhood.1
0 4
While exceptions do exist, prison gangs are usually formed
based on race. In general, Hispanic gang members join the Mexican
Mafia or Nuestra Familia, while black gang members tend to join the
Black Guerilla Family or smaller factions of the Bloods or Crips.1
0 5
White gang members join the Aryan Brotherhood. 10 6 There are no
known Asian prison gangs.107 While this is the trend, there are some
exceptions. One of the highest-ranking members of the Mexican
Mafia, Joe Morgan, spent four decades in prison and was the highest-
ranking non-hispanic member.'0 8  An extremely violent man,
Morgan grew up in East Los Angeles and adopted the Hispanic
culture.'0 9 He was depicted in the 1992 film "American Me."
110
When Morgan objected to parts of the film, two members of La Eme
who were working as advisors on the film were found murdered."'
Another Anglo member of the Mexican Mafia was Raymond
101. Tachiki, supra note 99, at 1126.
102. See generally Willens, supra note 98, at 55-56 (analyzing the response
by judges, penologists and the prison staff to the institutional management in
prisons); Tachiki, supra note 99, at 1126.
103. GANGS 2000: A CALL TO ACTION, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT
ON THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL STREET GANGS NO CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN
CALIFORNIA BY THE YEAR 2000, at http://www.cgiaonline.org (Mar. 1993)
[hereinafter GANGS 2000].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Mexican Mafia (La Eme), at http://www.geocities.com/
organizedcrimesyndicates/mexicanmafiaprisongang.html (last visited Aug. 13,
2003).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Shyrock.112 Like his mentor, Joe Morgan, Shyrock also grew up
around Hispanic gangs." 3 While these exceptions do exist, generally
gang members are recruited based on race.
There is some evidence that supports Johnson's proposition that
segregation has no effect on the levels of racial violence. In 2002, a
study was conducted to assess the effects of desegregation in
prisons.115  The study was performed in Texas, which, like
California, is one of the top three states affected by prison gangs.'
16
The study found that "the rate of assaults among desegregated
inmates was less than or at least equal to rate of assaults among
segregated inmates."' 17 In addition, "the integration did not result in
disproportionate violence." 118 In 1975, researcher Anthony Bottoms
performed a study of prison violence in California. He found that in
prisons where tighter security policies were enforced, there was a
significant decrease in the number of stabbings. 119 The researcher
hypothesized that the decline might be attributed to the reduced
opportunities for racial groups to combine to commit violent acts.'
20
While this information sheds some light on the different aspects of
racial violence, the reasoning of Johnson remains valid. Based on
the experience in that specific prison, the administrators felt that
during the reception period, the level of violence would decrease if
the prisoners were segregated.
The Turner and Johnson decisions are important because prison
is a unique institution that must be dealt with carefully. When asked
about the Turner test, David Fahti of the ACLU National Prison
Project responded, "Often times.., prison officials do not provide
any evidence that their regulation serves a legitimate prison interest
but simply come up with a post-hoc, speculative reason to justify the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See GANGS 2000, supra note 103.
115. See Chad Trulson, Of General Interest: The Caged Melting Pot:
Toward an Understanding of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons,
36 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 743 (2002).
116. Willens, supra note 98, at 56 n.69.
117. Trulson, supra note 115, at 774.
118. Id.
119. See Anthony E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and SocialOrder in
Prisons, 26 CRIME & JUST. 205, 238 (1999).
120. Id.
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restrictive policy."'12 1 However, in circumstances where a history of
violence is present within the specific prison, and the officials have
provided a legitimate penological interest, the Turner standard
should be utilized.
VI. CONCLUSION
Violations of constitutional rights in prisons are a common
allegation in courts around the country. Although Johnson did not
create new law, it illuminated the issue of racial prison violence in
California, where it is a significant problem. The Ninth Circuit held
that the rule to be applied in cases dealing with constitutional rights
violations in prisons is the Turner rule. Turner used a "relaxed
standard" when determining what constituted a violation in prison,
requiring only that the regulation be reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
prisoner safety and general control of the prison population were
legitimate penological interests and therefore did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and never reached the issue of qualified immunity because there was
no constitutional violation.
The Johnson decision is recent and has not yet been cited by
other courts. Nevertheless, it is likely that in years to come, Johnson
will be the premier case in California dealing with racial segregation
in prisons.
Julie Taylor
121. David L. Hudson Jr., Prisoners' Rights Overview, at http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/rel-liberty/freeexercise/topic.aspx?topic=pris
oner rights (last visited Aug. 13, 2003).
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